Pacheco, Julianna. "A Conditional Theory of Self-Interest and Symbolic Politics" Under Review
Abstract: Using the 2012 ANES, I find support for the conditional theory of self-interest. For policy preferences toward guaranteed jobs and national health insurance, I find evidence that self-interest indicators matter more for Republicans, as expected from theories of motivated reasoning, compared to Democrats. I then look more closely at preferences towards the Affordable Care Act (ACA). I find that self-interest has both a positive impact among strong Republicans and a negative impact among strong Democrats, causing partisans to converge in their policy preferences. Self-interest indicators may serve to integrate partisans on policy issues, as is the case with the ACA, and promote better decision-making. These are important caveats to political science research on motivated reasoning since such research primarily finds that affective biases polarize voters and lead to lower quality decisions.
Abstract: Using the 2012 ANES, I find support for the conditional theory of self-interest. For policy preferences toward guaranteed jobs and national health insurance, I find evidence that self-interest indicators matter more for Republicans, as expected from theories of motivated reasoning, compared to Democrats. I then look more closely at preferences towards the Affordable Care Act (ACA). I find that self-interest has both a positive impact among strong Republicans and a negative impact among strong Democrats, causing partisans to converge in their policy preferences. Self-interest indicators may serve to integrate partisans on policy issues, as is the case with the ACA, and promote better decision-making. These are important caveats to political science research on motivated reasoning since such research primarily finds that affective biases polarize voters and lead to lower quality decisions.